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Abstract
Open, distributed and multi-party systems provide an
infrastructure on which electronic transactions between or-
ganizations can be performed, pervading social and political
boundaries to facilitate the realization of novel organiza-
tional paradigms. Electronic transactions are, though, prone
to uncertainty amongst organizations and which can lead
to a perception of vulnerability to exploitative behavior. In
the presence of such behavior, the economic viability of
electronic transactions is endangered. Organizations may
perceive a vulnerability to such opportunistic behavior,
and therefore decide not to participate. In order to retain
the economic viability of these transactions, organizations
must perceive an alignment of interests with those of the
other organization in the transaction. Institutions can define
behavioral constraints over the organizations in the transac-
tion to manipulate the interests of an organization to attain
alignment, such that the behavior of each organization is
cooperative, and in the mutual interest. In this paper, we
investigate the utilization of institutions in electronic trans-
actions to attain cooperation and trust in cooperation, and
the realization of these institutions as distributed protocols.
1. Introduction
Open, distributed and multi-party systems provide an
infrastructure on which electronic transactions between orga-
nizations can be performed. This infrastructure can pervade
social and political boundaries to facilitate the realization
of novel organizational paradigms [1], [2] whose transac-
tions are “unencumbered by distance, time, commodity or
familiarity” [3]. Such novel organizational paradigms seek
to exploit the potential reduction in transaction costs [4]
promised by the infrastructure to augment organizational
efficiency, with an increased degree of specialization and the
The authors are supported in part by EPSRC Grant EP/F066937/1
(“Economics-inspired Instant Trust Mechanisms for the Service Provision
Industry”) and UK Department of Trade and Industry Grant P0007E
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division of labour [5]. Electronic transactions are, though,
prone to uncertainty with organizations possessing informa-
tion pertaining to the transaction which, due to a “lack of
expertise or access to data sources” [6], cannot be verified
by another organization. This can lead to the perception by
an organization that it is vulnerable to the “incomplete or
distorted disclosure” [7] of the information, as part of a “cal-
culated effort to mislead, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise
confuse” [7] by other organizations in the transaction. In
the presence of such vulnerability, the economic viability
of electronic transactions is endangered, with organizations
deciding not to participate in such transactions.
In order to retain the economic viability of electronic
transactions, organizations should perceive no vulnerability
to the exploitation of uncertain information, and that their
interests are aligned with those of other organizations in the
transaction. The perception of an organization comprises of
a set of institutions [8], [9], [10] which define behavioral
constraints over the organizations in a transaction. The
adherence to these institutions may be inherent to the organi-
zation, or may be incentivized using a “credible threat” [11]
of sanctions to manipulate the interests of an organization.
The perception of institutions leads to trust in the behavior
of other organizations, with the behavior of these organi-
zations constrained such that the organization perceives no
vulnerability to the exploitation of uncertain information,
and the alignment of the interests of the organizations in the
transaction.
Accordingly, we present an institutional approach to trust
in electronic transactions. We discuss the notions of cooper-
ation and trust from a general perspective, and describe how
institutions can both align the interests of organizations in a
transaction to attain cooperation and facilitate the perception
of this alignment to attain trust in the cooperation. We
discuss the different types of institution and how these
institutions relate to the dimensions of cooperation and an-
tecedents of trust. The utilization of institutions in electronic
transactions is explained, and we describe how these insti-
tutions can be modeled and analyzed using concepts from
game theory. We then describe the realization of institutions
as distributed protocols, and show how the properties of
these distributed protocols can be verified at design-time,
or at run-time as part of the perception by an organization.
Accordingly, we provide an approach to the formal analysis
of trust in electronic transactions, and a framework for the
construction of protocols for electronic transactions which
induce cooperation, and importantly trust in cooperation.
2. Cooperation
In this section, we discuss the notion of cooperation from
a general perspective, and introduce the various dimensions
of a situation determine the propensity of an organization to
cooperate.
Cooperation constitutes the adjustment of the interests by
an organization to the “actual or perceived interests” [12]
of another organization. This cooperation can emerge when
there is a coexistence of mutual and conflicting interests
amongst organizations [12], [11]. In the case of pure conflict
amongst organizations, cooperation cannot emerge due to the
absence of mutual interest. An organization perceives the
situation in order to determine its propensity to cooperate,
and the propensity of other organizations to cooperate.
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Figure 1. Perception Of Cooperation
2.1. Dimensions Of Cooperation
The propensity of an organization to cooperate is deter-
mined by the perception of certain situational dimensions
[12]. We describe these dimensions below:
2.1.1. Mutuality Of Interests. Mutuality of interests refers
to a perception by an organization of the inherent alignment
of their interests with those of another organization.
2.1.2. Shadow Of The Future. Shadow of the future refers
to a perception by an organization that no adjustment of
interests in the present, will lead to reciprocity and retaliation
by another organization in the future.
2.1.3. Sanctioning. Sanctioning refers to a perception by an
organization that no adjustment of interests can be detected
and sanctioned by another organization.
3. Trust
In this section, we discuss the notion of trust from a
general perspective, and introduce the various antecedents
of trust.
Trust is the subjective belief that an organization (Trustee)
will behave in a particular manner, given that the interests
of another organization (Trustor) are affected by the behav-
ior and the trustor is uncertain about the interests of the
trustee. It encapsulates a measure of predictability [13] and
vulnerability [14] for an organization. The perception of a
situation by an organization is prone to uncertainty, due to
the practical infeasibility of omniscience. An organization
can be uncertain of the interests of another organization,
and therefore to he manner in which the organization will
behave. This uncertainty is represented in a subjective belief;
the trust that an organization will behave in a particular
manner.
3.1. Antecedents Of Trust
The subjective belief of an organization can be formulated
from a number of different antecedents. These antecedents
can be classified in varied manners [15], [16], [17], [18],
[19]. We broadly classify these antecedents as follows:
3.1.1. Cognitive-Based Trust. Cognitive-based trust refers
to beliefs based upon rapid, cognitive cues and the inherent
propensity of an organization to depend on another organi-
zation.
3.1.2. Knowledge-Based Trust. Knowledge-based refers to
beliefs based upon first-hand knowledge of another organi-
zation. This antecedent is often referred to as norm-based,
societal or familiarity-based trust.
3.1.3. Deterrence-Based Trust. Deterrence-based refers to
beliefs based upon guarantees and structural assurances
within the situation. This antecedent is often referred to as
institutional or system trust.
4. Institutions
In this section, we describe how institutions can both
align the interests of organizations in a transaction to attain
cooperation and facilitate the perception of this alignment
to attain trust in cooperation.
Institutions [8], [9], [10] define behavioral constraints
for organizations to “define and limit the set of choices”
[8] and provide a “device for coping with the freedom”
[20] of organizations to behave autonomously. In a given
situation, an organization perceives two sets of institutions:
first-order and second-order. First-order institutions define
behavioral constraints on the organization which is perceiv-
ing the situation. Second-order institutions define behavioral
constraints on the other organizations in the situation, under
the assumption that the situation is “strategic” [11], with
interdependence of behavior amongst organizations.
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Figure 2. Perception Of Institutions
4.1. Types Of Institutions
There are different types of institutions [9] which can be
perceived in a situation. We describe each of these types
below:
4.1.1. Cognitive Institutions. Cognitive institutions define
behavioral constraints in the form of categories, classi-
fications and behavioral scripts. The adherence to these
behavioral constraints is an inherent part of the performance
of any cognitive process by the organization, and defines
the inherent interests of an organization. The perception of
these institutions in the set of second-order institutions of an
organization can lead to cooperation through the dimension
of ‘mutuality of interests’. An organization perceives the
presence of a cognitive institution such that the interests
of the organization are inherently aligned with other or-
ganizations. This perception of second-order institutions is,
though, prone to uncertainty, and the subjective belief that
the organization will behave in a given manner, as defined by
the behavioral constraints, is formulated from the ‘cognitive-
based trust’ antecedent.
4.1.2. Normative Institutions. Normative institutions de-
fine behavioral constraints in the form of norms, values and
expectations. The adherence to these behavioral constraints
is enforced by the “credible threat” [11] of reciprocity, which
can manipulate the interests of organizations to incentivize
behavior in conformance with the defined norms and values.
The perception of these institutions in the set of second-
order institutions by an organization can lead to cooperation
through the dimension of ’shadow of the future’. An orga-
nization perceives the presence of a normative institution
such that no adjustment of interests in the present by
other organizations will lead to reciprocity and retaliation
in the future. This perception of second-order institutions is,
though, prone to uncertainty, and the subjective belief that an
organization will behave in a given manner, as defined by the
behavioral constraints, is formulated from the ’knowledge-
based trust’ antecedent.
4.1.3. Regulative Institutions. Regulative institutions de-
fine behavioral constraints in the form of rules and laws.
The adherence to these behavioral constraints is enforced by
the “credible threat” [11] of detection and sanctioning for
the violation of rules and laws, which can manipulate the
interests of organizations to incentivize behavior in confor-
mance with the defined norms and values. The perception of
these institutions in the set of second-order institutions by an
organization can lead to cooperation through the dimension
of ’sanctioning’. An organization perceives the presence of
a regulative institution such that no adjustment of interests
by other organizations will lead to detection and sanctioning.
This perception of second-order institutions is, though, prone
to uncertainty, and the subjective belief that the organization
will behave in a given manner, as defined by the behavioral
constraints, is formulated from the ’deterrence-based trust’
antecedent. Accordingly, the subjective belief is placed in
the detection and sanctioning rather than directly in the other
organization.
4.2. Dependencies Of Institutions
There is dependencies amongst the institutions perceived
by an organization in a given situation. The normative
and regulative institutions perceived in a given situation
can be defined with a dependency on certain cognitive
institutions. These dependencies facilitate the definition of
further behavioral constraints by the normative and regu-
lative institutions under the assumption of the constraints
defined by these cognitive institutions. Additionally, there
can be dependencies amongst normative and regulative
institutions, with normative institutions defining behavioral
constraints which rely on certain behavioral constraints
defined by underlying regulative institutions. For example,
a trade association is a normative institution which provides
accreditation for organizations and defines norms and values
to which these organizations are incentivized to adhere, and
this trade association; relying on the regulative institution
of commercial law to provide behavioral constraints on the
existence of organizations. The perception of an institution,
and the efficacy of the behavioral constraints defined by that
institution is, therefore, dependent on the perception of those
institutions which are dependencies.
5. Institutions For Electronic Transactions
In this section, we discuss the utilization of institutions
in electronic transactions to retain the economic viability of
these transactions.
5.1. Electronic Transactions
An electronic transaction is the bilateral exchange [21],
[22] of a resource xA ∈ XA, where XA is the possession set
of an organization A, and a resource xB ∈ XB , where XB
is the possession set of an organization B. The interests of
an organization impose values on resources in the possession
set [23], such that xk  xm denotes a partial ordering of
set of resources xk over xm. A resource can represent any
digitally-encoded good or service, and we assume that each
resource x ∈ X yields positive value for any organization.
In a transaction, an organization possesses private infor-
mation pertaining to the resources in its possession set which
due to a “lack of expertise or access to data sources” [6],
cannot be verified by the other organization. Other organiza-
tion are, therefore, uncertain with regard to this information.
Given these uncertainties, an organization is vulnerable to
exploitation by other organizations, with “incomplete or
distorted disclosure” [7] of the information in order to
make a “calculated effort to mislead, disguise, obfuscate,
or otherwise confuse” [7].
The transaction can be partitioned into three sequential
stages, at which information can be exploited. We discuss
each of these stages below and the vulnerability present at
that stage:
5.1.1. Negotiation. In the negotiation stage of a transaction,
A and B agree on the resources to exchange. An organiza-
tion has asymmetric information pertaining to the resources
in its possession set which cannot be verified by the other or-
ganization. An organization can agree to exchange a resource
which it does not possess (including a resource of different
quality). We assume this information to pertain to the quality
of the resource, q(xk) ∈ [0, 1]. An organization is uncertain
about the quality of the resource which it will receive in
the exchange with another organization. This formulation
of quality can also represent uncertainty with regard to
delivery, where uncertainty about delivery is uncertainty that
q(xk) = 0. It is assumed that this quality is a verifiable
variable. This is an example of the adverse selection problem
[24], with the possession of asymmetric information before
the exchange is agreed between organizations.
5.1.2. Enactment. In the enactment stage of a transaction,
the organizations realize an allocation of resources to pos-
session sets. An organization has asymmetric information
pertaining to the costly effort, e, made to realize the alloca-
tion of resources from the negotiation stage. An organization
can exert no effort to realize the resource allocation and
exchange an inferior quality resource, in order to yield
a greater proportion of the gains from the trade. This is
an example of the moral hazard problem [25], [26] with
possession of asymmetric information after the exchange is
agreed between organizations.
5.1.3. Settlement. In the settlement stage of a transac-
tion, the organizations verify the allocation of resources
in possession sets against the agreement. An organization
has asymmetric information pertaining to the resource in
its possession set which cannot be verified by the other
organization. An organization can claim that it possess a
resource which it does not possess (including a resource of
different quality or no resource). This is an example of non-
verifiability with the possession of asymmetric information
after the exchange is enacted between organizations.
5.2. Dependencies In Electronic Transactions
The pervasion of socio-political boundaries in electronic
transactions can provide inconsistency in the perception of
organizations. In different social domains, organizations will
perceive different normative and cognitive institutions, and
in different political domains, organizations will perceive
different regulative systems. In the definition of institutions
for electronic transactions, it cannot be assumed that organi-
zations have an analogous underlying institutions. Instead, a
trans-social, trans-political framework for institutions must
be provided, such that further institutions can be defined for
electronic transactions utilizing this framework.
In the next three sections we define the cognitive institu-
tion which will form the basis of this framework, and define
a model for normative and regulative institutions based upon
this cognitive institution.
5.3. Cognitive Institutions
Cognitive institutions define the inherent behavioral con-
straints of an organization, and seek to provide an abstraction
of the highly complex process of human decision-making,
which can utilize intangible factors such as emotions. The
cognitive institutions commonly utilized for electronic trans-
actions are: obedience, malevolence and benevolence. Obe-
dience stipulates that the behavior of an organization is in-
herently cooperative, malevolence stipulates that the behav-
ior is inherently non-cooperative, and benevolence stipulates
that behavior is inherently and unilaterally in the interests
of the other organization. These cognitive institutions form
the foundation of many different regulative and normative
institutions for electronic transactions. For example, strong
fair exchange protocols utilize the cognitive institution of
malevolence for organizations. These institutions are unreal-
istic, characterizing an organization as obedient, malevolent,
or benevolent independent on the context of the transaction.
We choose to utilize a general cognitive institution of
“bounded rationality” [27], [28], which stipulates that or-
ganizations behave with freewill and self-interest, with be-
havior which is “intendedly rational” [4] given their subjec-
tive beliefs. Organizations impose of values on resources,
modeled by a utility function, ui : X → R, which assigns
real values to resources such that if ui(xk) ≥ ui(xm) then
xk  xm, and seek to maximize their utility in a transaction.
For simplification, it is assumed that an organization is risk-
neutral and is therefore indifferent between a real value
with certainty and a real value in expectation. This cognitive
institution provides sufficient generality to form the under-
lying dependency of any normative or regulative institution
for electronic transactions. Therefore, instead of designing
normative and regulative institutions for the “worst-case” of
malevolence as the underlying cognitive institution, these in-
stitutions can be defined from an “average-case” perspective
of bounded rationality.
5.3.1. Model. The cognitive institution of bounded ratio-
nality can be formulated into a model based upon game
theory to facilitate the analysis of behavior. An organization
can choose from a set of possible strategies, Ci, where a
strategy ci ∈ Ci is a function that specifies the action ci(s)
of the organization in information state s. The information
state represents the information held by the organization
on the state of the transaction, and is represented by a
probability distribution over the set of states, Ys in which
the transaction could reside. Information states facilitate the
representation of the uncertainty in quality of an organization
in the transaction. For each information state, s ∈ Si, Di
denotes the set of actions available to i. An organization
has a probability of performing a given action at each
information state represented by the probability distribution:
∏
s∈Si
∆(Ds)
.
The utility function of an organization specifies the value
of the resources possessed given the strategy of each orga-
nization.
ui =
∏
j∈{A,B}
Cj → R
5.4. Normative Institutions
Normative institutions define behavioral constraints for an
organization based on norms and values. These norms and
values are formulated through repeated transactions between
organizations, with reciprocity and the threat of retaliation
enforcing the adherence to the norms and values. These
norms and values are represented as subjective beliefs that
other organizations will behave in a certain manner, that is,
the trust in the other organizations.
5.4.1. Model. In an information state, s where #(Ys) > 1,
an organization is uncertain of some previous action in the
transaction. The subjective belief of the organization is the
probability distribution over these states, and an organization
utilizes these beliefs to decide on an action in accordance
with bounded rationality. Through the process of updating
beliefs, the organization can formulate norms and values,
such that the beliefs of each organization denote trust in the
behavior of other organizations.
We can represent electronic transactions, and the behav-
ioral constraints of the institutions defined over the transac-
tions in an extensive-form game. A game is defined by a
rooted tree T = (V,E) (see Figure 3). This consists of a
set of nodes, V , connected by a set of edges, E. An edge
represents the performance of action within the transaction.
A node v ∈ V can be of three types: chance, decision or
terminal. A chance node is a node at which the subsequent
action of the transaction is selected at random, in accordance
with a defined probability distribution. A decision node is
a node at which the subsequent action of the transaction
is selected by an organization. A terminal node is a node
at which no actions are selected and represent an outcome
of the transaction, that is, an allocation of resources to the
possession sets of organizations.
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Figure 3. Extensive Form Game
5.5. Regulative Institutions
Regulative institutions define behavioral constraints for
an organization based on rules and laws. These rules and
laws are defined by organizations or by a third party,
with the adherence to these rules and laws provided by
an appropriately powerful third party. The rules and laws
determine the form of the game representing the transaction,
and the third parties enforce the structure of this game, that
is, the ordering and the payoffs.
5.5.1. Model. Regulative institutions determine the alloca-
tion of resources at the end of the transaction. They manip-
ulate the utility which an organization can yield from taking
certain actions, given that these actions are verifiable. They
determine the ordering of the actions within the transaction
to reduce the vulnerability of organizations, and dictate the
nodes within the information states of organizations. The
verification of the quality and delivery of the resources in
the exchange faciltates the provision of appropriate sanctions
for violation of the rules and laws of the transaction which
determine the utility of each organization.
5.5.2. Trusted Third Parties. A trusted third party has
the complete, subjective belief of other organizations in
the transaction to behave in a given manner. The party can
provide a consistent perception of the situation to other
organizations such that the set of second-order institutions
perceived by these organizations are consistent.
• Detection
The detection of behavior by trusted third parties re-
quires the verifiability of behavior. This detection can
be performed at two different points of the transaction:
online and offline. Online detection means that the
behavior of each organization is detected by the trusted
third party at the negotiation and enactment stage of the
transaction. Offline detection means that the behavior
of each organization is detected by the trusted third
party after the enactment stage of the transaction. The
detection by a third party ensures that in a game, the
information state s is such that #(Ys) = 1, that is, there
is no uncertainty about the state of the transaction.
• Sanctioning
The sanctioning of behavior by trusted third parties
requires that the trusted third party has the power to
control the possession of resources by organizations.
Conventionally, sanctions constitute the relinquishment
of the resources in the transaction, and the monetary
or reputation resources of the organizations in the
transaction. The sanctioning by a third party ensures
that in a game, payoffs can be associated with each
path of play such that the paths on which the actions
are cooperative are bounded rational.
5.6. Behavioral Constraints For Cooperation
A strategy profile is a combination of strategies that the
organizations in the transaction might select. The set of
possible strategy profiles is denoted by:
C =
∏
i∈{A,B}
Ci
For any strategy profile c = (ci)i∈{A,B}, ui(c) represents
the expected utility for organization i in that profile. A
behavioral strategy profile specifies a probability distribution
over the set of possible actions at each possible information
state, and therefore specifies a probability for every edge at
every decision node in the game tree. The set of behavioral
strategy profiles is denoted by:
∏
i∈{A,B}
(
∏
s∈Si
∆(Ds))
An equilibrium in the transaction is defined in terms of
behavioral strategies. A strategy is sequentially rational for
i at information state s ∈ Si if the organization would want
to do what this strategy specifies at s that state occurs. A
belief vector specifies the probability distribution for each
information state of each organization:
pi = (pii.s)i∈{A,B},s∈Si
A behavioral strategy profile σ is sequentially rational for
i at s with beliefs pi if and only if:
σi.s ∈ argmax
ρs∈∆(Ds)
Σx∈Yspii.s(x)Ui(σ−i.s, ρs|x)
For any action es ∈ Ds, where s ∈ Si, organization i’s
conditional expected utility is:
Σx∈Yspii.s(x)Ui(σ−i.s, [es]|x)
A sequential equilibrium is any (σ, pi) such that σ is a
behavioral strategy in:
∏
s∈S∗
∆(Ds)
and pi is a belief vector in
∏
s∈S∗
∆(Ys)
and σ is sequentially rational for every organization at
every information state with beliefs pi.
This equilibrium represents the predicted outcome of
the transaction, given the sequential rationality of each
organization. The beliefs of the organization at the start
of the transaction, known as prior beliefs, can represent
the disposition of an organization to trust, in the case of
a regulative institution, or can represent the disposition of
an organization to trust along with updates from knowledge
gained by organizations, in the case of a normative institu-
tion.
The equilibrium can exhibit certain constraints which
affect the cooperation of an organization in the transaction.
We describe two important constraints below:
5.6.1. Participation Constraint. The participation con-
straint ensures that organizations will participate in an insti-
tution, and is important when participation in an institution
is voluntary. The constraint stipulates that both organizations
yield positive utility given any strategy from the other
organization in the transaction.
ui(ci) ≥ 0
where cj ∈ σ, ∀i, j ∈ {A,B} and i 6= j.
5.6.2. Cooperation Constraint. The cooperation constraint
ensures that organizations will cooperate in an institution.
The constraint stipulates that if one organization yields
positive utility in equilibrium then the other organization
will yield positive utility in equilibrium.
ui(ci) ≥ 0⇔ uj(cj) ≥ 0
where ci, cj ∈ σ, i, j ∈ {A,B} and i 6= j.
6. Distributed Protocols For Electronic Trans-
actions
In this section, we describe the realization of institutions
through distributed protocols, and show how the properties
of these distributed protocols can be verified at design-time,
or at run-time as part of the perception by an organization.
6.1. Cognitive Institutions
The cognitive institution of bounded rationality can
be modeled as a Probabilistic Input/Output Automata
(PIOA) [29], [30], [31]. A PIOA takes the form: P =
〈Q, q, I, O,H,D〉. The set of states in the automata is
represented by Q with the start state of the automata
represented by q ∈ Q. The set of actions which can be
performed within the automata are contained in the set I , O
and H which represents the set of input, output and internal
actions respectively. An action a is enabled in a state q if
(q, a, µ) ∈ D for some µ. The set A = I ∪ O ∪ H is the
action alphabet of P , where the set of external actions is
defined by E = I ∪ O, and the set of locally controlled
actions is defined by L = O ∪H . The transition relation of
P is defined by D ⊆ (Q× (I ∪O ∪H)×Disc(Q) where
Disc(Q) is the set of probability distributions on Q.
The input actions, I , represent those action within the
transaction that can be observed by the organization. The
output actions, O represent those actions of the organization
which can be observed by other organizations in the trans-
action. The internal actions H represent those actions which
are hidden from other organizations. Given that the purpose
of the transaction is to exchange resources, the negotiation
of the exchange and the actual exchange of resources will
be performed utilizing input and output actions. The internal
actions constitute the decision-making process of the orga-
nization, in accordance with bounded rationality. Therefore,
an internal action can yield a output action or no action. The
transaction relation of the PIOA represents the probabilistic
transition of the automata between states. These states are
determined by the normative and regulative institutions
which depend on this institution, and the probabilities of
the transition relation represent the probability of taking
certain actions or making certain transitions within the
transaction. The transition relation maps onto the distribution
over actions at each information state, such that each state
of the PIOA represents an information state.
6.2. Normative Institutions
Normative institutions can be represented by the be-
lief system contained with the automata representing the
cognitive institution. The normative institutions define the
states of the PIOA as expectations of norms and values,
and through the repetition of transaction, the probabilities
associated with the transition relation are manipulated to
represent the beliefs of the organization. The expectations
can be explicitly represented in the negotiation stage of the
transaction through appropriate input and output actions in
the PIOA of the organizations.
6.3. Regulative Institutions
Regulative institutions can be represented through the
utilization of appropriate trusted third parties. The rules
and laws can be defined by either the organizations or the
third party, but the third parties perform the detection and
sanctioning of the violation of rules and laws. The actions
of each organization in the transaction must be verifiable,
such that the third party can detect the behavior in an
unambiguous manner. This verifiability can be achieved
with appropriate cryptographic primitives which can provide
non-repudiation of the actions of organizations. The PIOA
of each organization, in this case, perform the appropriate
encryption and signing of actions in its cognitive process,
such that the verifiability can be attained.
The third parties which can be utilized to legitimize a
regulative institution are described below. These third parties
can be modeled as PIOAs such that their functionality is
well-defined.
6.3.1. Identifier. An identifier can provide a consistent
identity for organizations in the transaction. This facilitates
the association of actions to organizations, and provides the
ability to sanction organizations be violation of the rules and
laws.
6.3.2. Escrow. An escrow can detect the quality and deliv-
ery of a digital good during a transaction. The escrow detects
the state of the transaction through the verifiable actions
it observes during the transaction. It can be represented
by a PIOA which has input actions for any output actions
performed by each organization, and an output action which
defines the state of the transaction and the allocation of
resources to the possession sets of organizations.
6.3.3. Arbitrator. An arbitrator can detect the quality and
delivery of a digital good after a transaction. The arbitrator
is an identical PIOA to the escrow, except it is not an
intermediary during the transaction. The arbitrator is invoked
if it is determined by an organization that the rules and laws
of the transaction were violated by the other transaction.
6.3.4. Bank. A bank can provide monetary sanctions in a
transaction. In the case that the resources in the exchange
cannot be revoked if a violation is detected after the trans-
action by an arbitrator, a bank can be utilized to provide
appropriate expropriation of monetary resources held by the
violating organization.
6.3.5. Reputation Holder. A reputation holder can provide
reputation sanctions in a transaction. In the case that a
violation is detected after the transaction by an arbitrator,
a reputation holder can be utilized to adjust the reputation
of the violating organization such that the value of that
reputation is decreased by an appropriate amount. It can
be represented by a PIOA which holds a belief system in
a similar manner to an organization, but this belief system
would be public and could be utilized by organization to
update and create their own belief systems.
6.4. Behavioral Constraints For Cooperation
In order to provide design-time or run-time verification
of the distributed protocol for the probability with which
an organization will cooperate, the automata representing
the components of protocol can be composed. That is, the
automata representing the organizations in the transaction
and any third parties involved in the transaction. Indeed, this
could be augmented further to include automata representing
the communication channels along which the organizations
communicate. This would facilitate the consideration of the
impact of unreliable communication channels on coopera-
tion and trust in cooperation in electronic transactions. For
simplicity, we omit such consideration in this work. At
run-time, an organization can verify the probability with
which another organization will cooperate, given the set of
second-order institutions perceived. In order to verify that
the resultant PIOA has certain properties, a test can be
built. A test is a PIOA with a specific output action, ω,
representing the properties that is desired. The probability
with which the property is fulfilled in all execution of
the test automata can be calculated, and this probability
represents the probability with which cooperation will be
attained between organizations, and therefore the trust in
the cooperation.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an institutional approach
to trust in electronic transactions. We have discussed cooper-
ation and trust from a general perspective, and linked these
notions to institutions, with a discussion of the different
types of institution and how these institutions relate to the
dimensions of cooperation and antecedents of trust. We
describe how these institutions can be modeled and ana-
lyzed using concepts from game theory. We then dsicussed
the realization of institutions as distributed protocols, and
described how the properties of these distributed protocols
can be verified at design-time, or at run-time as part of the
perception by an organization. Accordingly, we provide an
approach to the formal analysis of trust in electronic trans-
actions, and a framework for the construction of protocols
for electronic transactions which induce cooperation, and
importantly trust in cooperation.
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